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Descartes on Love and/as Error 
Byron Williston 
But if this medicine, love, which cures all sorrow 
With more, not only be no quintessence, 
But mixed of all stuffs, paining soul, or sense, 
And of the sun his working vigour borrow, 
Love's not so pure, and abstract, as they use 
To say, which have no mistress but their Muse, 
But as all else, being elemented too, 
Love sometimes would contemplate, sometimes do.' 
One of philosophy's most enduring questions is inspired by Plato's 
Euthyphro: do we love something because it is lovable, or is it lovable because 
we love it?2 Perhaps nowhere is this problem more intractable than in Descartes's 
theory of love. In his view love is the concrete attempt on the part of humans to 
develop an ethical reciprocity which ideally fulfils the need both to discover 
and to create value. The strict disjunction of the Platonic question is to this 
extent somewhat misleading because Descartes is genuinely challenged by the 
respective demands of both sides of the question. It would therefore be a mis- 
take to fasten on one side of this distinction to the utter exclusion of the other. 
But the temptation to do precisely this with Descartes is strong indeed. 
This is a temptation which extends even to ethical matters, in which Descartes 
seems loathe to subordinate the search for certainty to merely contingent prac- 
tical demands. In addressing the problem of moral weakness he writes, for 
For their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I would like to thank Ronald 
de Sousa, Andre Gombay, and Robert Imlay. 
"Love's Growth," John Donne: The Complete English Poems, ed. A. J. Smith (London, 
1986), 69. 
2 Plato, Euthyphro, from Five Dialogues, tr. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis, 1981), 14. 
Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 1, addresses this 
problem as the "antinomy of objectivity," which derives from the "plausibility of both alterna- 
tive answers" to the question of the Euthyphro. 
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example, that "the strength of the soul is inadequate without knowledge of the 
truth."3 The call to live in the light of certain truths-moral or otherwise-is so 
persistent a theme for him that the burden of proof would seem to be on those 
who want to claim that this is nevertheless not so in certain areas. The bulk of 
this paper is thus devoted to showing that, despite some appearances, Descartes 
is not concerned overmuch with the problem of attaining certainty and avoid- 
ing error in love judgments. He wants us to see love as a complex psycho- 
physical phenomenon which cannot be reduced to the desire to obtain true 
judgments about the world. 
To focus the discussion I examine Irving Singer's philosophy of love as 
presented in The Nature of Love and especially his hermeneutic distinction 
between "appraisal" and "bestowal," a distinction which maps felicitously onto 
the Platonic disjunction as sketched above. Singer criticizes the Cartesian theory 
of love as excessively "appraisive," that is, as relying too heavily on an objec- 
tive standard as guarantor of the worth of beloved objects. I maintain on the 
contrary that this interpretation distorts what Descartes's texts tell us. By argu- 
ing that the will, with no necessary input from the appraising intellect, is para- 
mount in love judgments, I show that love for Descartes is largely an imagina- 
tive means of "bestowing" value which as such does not require either the 
guidance or the corroboration of objective criteria. The bestowal theory war- 
rants, rather, the free subjective creation of value. The distinction which Singer 
uses to criticize Descartes is thus turned to Descartes's favor. 
I. Before getting to that argument, however, we need to examine the place 
which love as a specific passion has within the overall economy of the third 
notion primitive,4 that is, the union of body and soul as distinct from the treat- 
ment of these elements as mutually separate. Passions are for Descartes a spe- 
cies of thought. In a general sense all "perceptions" are passions of the soul. 
They represent the world to the will which then acts in some way on them 
("action" is taken as the other species of thought). Now of these perceptions 
generally considered, some are caused by the external objects of the senses5 
and some by the natural appetites and affections of the body.6 There are, how- 
ever, those perceptions "whose effects we feel as being in the soul itself...." 
These are strictly speaking the "passions" of the soul; and despite our not al- 
ways being able to locate their proximate cause,8 they may be stimulated by the 
3 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, article 49 (Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Adam and 
Tannery [rev. ed.; Paris, 1964-76], XI, 368; hereafter cited as AT); all references from The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (Cam- 
bridge, 1985), I, II and III. 
4 For Descartes's reference to the notions primitives, see Letter to Elizabeth, 5.21.1643 
(AT, III, 663). 
5 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, article 23 (AT, XI, 346). 
6 Ibid., article 24 (AT, XI, 347). 
7 Ibid., article 25 (AT, XI, 348). 
8 Ibid. 
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"fortuitous movement of the spirits,"9 by intellectual judgments, or by external 
objects which "excite" the nerves.10 
With external sensory perceptions (like hearing or sight) the object-what 
the perception is responding to-or remote cause of the perception is located 
outside us. With the internal sensations (like hunger) the object or remote cause 
is inside the body (recall Descartes's claim in the Sixth Meditation that the heat 
we feel on placing our hand near the fire cannot reside in the fire itself"). On 
the one hand the locus and cause of both these classes of perceptions is entirely 
related to the body. On the other hand the "actions" of the soul (desire and will) 
have their locus and cause in the soul. But the passions have their locus inside 
the soul, their remote cause or object most often (but by no means always) 
outside the body (the charging lion which provokes either courage or fear) and 
their proximate cause in the bodily movements of the spirits. 
A problem arises, however, regarding the lack of precision in some of the 
distinctions Descartes is making here. Most glaringly, perhaps, it is difficult to 
distinguish clearly the external sensory perceptions from the passions from 
what has been said so far. Both respond principally to external stimuli and 
result in "ideas" in the soul. To clarify this ambiguity, it is helpful to examine 
in turn two aspects of Descartes's definition of passions of the soul, the first of 
which describes a mechanical difference between passions and the rest of the 
perceptions and the second what can loosely be termed a phenomenological 
difference. 
Descartes maintains that the passions of the soul are "caused, maintained 
and strengthened by some particular movement of the spirits."12 All passions 
have their "last and most proximate cause" in this source.'3 Descartes tells us 
that this is meant to distinguish passions both from volitions-which as the 
source of free activity are uncaused-and from other perceptions. Unfortu- 
nately, Descartes does not explain here what the last and most proximate cause 
of these other perceptions could be if it is not the spirits. Stephen Voss has tried 
to vindicate Descartes on this score by asserting that the last and most proxi- 
mate cause of sensory ideas is an activity of the nerves rather than the spirits.'4 
Presumably, this does not mean that in the case of the passions, the nerves have 
no role whatsoever to play. In the case of a situation leading to the passion of 
fear, for example, the spirits will commonly do two things simultaneously: 
they will stimulate the nerves which make the body turn and run from the 
9 Ibid., article 26 (AT, XI, 349). 10 For a succinct summary of the Cartesian perception types and their causes, cf. de 
Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, 29. 1 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (AT, VII, 83). 
12 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul article 27 (AT, XI, 349). 
13 Ibid., article 29 (AT, XI, 350). 
14 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, tr. Stephen H. Voss (Indianapolis, 1989), 35, n. 30. 
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threatening object; and they will stimulate the nerves of the heart to rarefy the 
blood in such a way that spirits which first cause, then maintain and strengthen 
the passion are continually sent to the brain (this is why we "feel" the passion 
as though it were in the heart). In both cases the nerves are necessary interme- 
diaries. 
However, with internal or external sensations, so goes the argument, the 
nervous connection between the brain and the various parts of the body is in the 
end responsible for the generation of sensory ideas. If Voss is right, in distin- 
guishing the passions and the external sensations in this way Descartes would 
be saying that, for example, the nerves do not require the assistance of the 
spirits in causing a sensation of (say) yellow. But this explanation collapses on 
closer inspection. In the Treatise on Man Descartes maintains that although the 
nerves are sufficient for imprinting the movements of particular objects on the 
internal surface of the brain, such movements must at that point be transmitted 
by the spirits in determinate ways to the pineal gland.'5 With all perceptions, 
then, the spirits play a crucial role in the conversion of physical entities into 
mental ones, and Descartes is clear that this functionfollows that of the nerves 
in the causal sequence. Without the spirits there could never be ideas, properly 
speaking. Thus the nerves cannot be the "last and most proximate cause" of 
sensory ideas, as Voss maintains. 
For this reason we must look with suspicion on Descartes's attempt to 
distinguish passions from other perceptions in a purely mechanical manner. 
However, although the causal account of the distinction is not acceptable, 
Descartes's mechanical distinction may still be tenable if we claim that with 
the passions there is somehow simply "more" spirit-activity than there is for 
the other perceptions. Thus Voss declares that the spirits "have only a bit part to 
play" in the formation of sensory ideas, whereas their role is paramount in the 
formation of the passions. This quantitative distinction is entirely too vague, 
however, and is in any case not borne out by the texts Voss cites.16 We are 
therefore left to conclude that Descartes offers us no rigorous mechanical dis- 
tinction between the idea types in question. 
But a more promising avenue of inquiry remains open to us. According to 
Descartes, the passions and the sensations have distinct phenomenological "ref- 
erences." We "refer" a passion directly to the soul and not to the stimulus (thus 
its locus is in the soul), whereas we "refer" an external sensory perception to 
the object stimulating the body and not to the mind where the idea is repre- 
sented (thus its locus is in the external world). An internal sensation we "refer" 
to the body (thus its locus is the body).17 This "referencing" is not meant to 
15 Descartes, Treatise on Man (AT, XI, 142-44). 
16 Voss, The Passions of the Soul, 35, fn 30. Voss cites the Passions, articles 12, 23, and 24 
(AT, XI, 337, 346 and 347). 
17 For the three separate types of reference, cf. Descartes, The Passions of the Soul articles 
23, 24, and 25 (AT, XI, 346-48). 
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carry very much scientific precision. We can, for example, confusedly imagine 
that a pain is "located" in the limb where we feel it, though strictly speaking a 
pain is a thought. 
But such confused thinking is not illegitimate at a more fundamental evel. 
For referencing, on Descartes's understanding of it, seems to describe our im- 
mediate or visceral relation to the perception in question, a relation based on 
the exigencies of experience. The importance of our being aware of this rela- 
tion is different for each of the perception types. In the case of external sensa- 
tion the importance is epistemological-we are concerned to know the truth of 
the corporeal world in which we move. In the case of internal sensation the 
importance is functional-we need to know when our body is in danger or is 
expressing basic needs so that we may preserve it more efficiently. In the case 
of the passions, the importance is chiefly moral-we need to know how to 
enhance or perfect ourselves insofar as we are rational, though embodied, crea- 
tures. 
Moreover, since external sensory perceptions almost always alert us to the 
existence of real objects in the world, they can be rendered less obscure through 
the application of mathematical and geometrical analysis. But the passions 
"are so close and so internal to our soul" that, even when severely disordered, 
they are not susceptible of correction in the same way.18 In the end the informa- 
tion of the external senses, once linked up clearly and distinctly with the matter 
it represents, is our guide through the world of extension, whereas the passions 
never lose their rootedness in the mind as embodied, and never therefore relin- 
quish their status as irreducibly "confused." So the analysis of "referencing" 
not only helps us distinguish the passions proper from other perceptions, it is 
also Descartes's best way of elucidating just what the passions are for us. The 
passions serve us, that is, solely to the extent that they cause us to want those 
things which nature has deemed useful for us qua compound substances.'9 
Thus the passions are concerned specifically with the union of body and soul. 
They are in fact the highest and most complex function of this third notion 
primitive. 
Now the passion of love has a distinguished place in this category. Descartes 
defines love thus: "Love is an emotion of the soul caused by a movement of the 
spirits, which impels the soul to join itself willingly [de volonte] to objects that 
appear to be agreeable to it."20 Descartes says elsewhere that when we think of 
something as beneficial for us, we are drawn towards it and thus love it. Con- 
versely, when we perceive something to be of potential harm to us, we are 
impelled away from it, and consequently hate it.21 This picture is complicated 
18 Ibid., article 26 (AT, XI, 349). 
19 Ibid., article 52 (AT, XI, 372). Cf. also articles 40 and 74 (AT, XI, 359 and 383). 
20 Ibid., article 79 (AT, XI, 387). 
21 Ibid., article 56 (AT, XI, 374). 
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considerably in that Descartes follows Augustine in dividing love into two types, 
the purely intellectual and the properly passionate. Descartes explains that in- 
tellectual, or rational, love is based on an assessment of the beloved's "objec- 
tive" worth. The soul is drawn to join itself to such an object and to consider 
itself as part of the whole which is thus engendered. Moreover, so pure is this 
type of love, that it can exist in the soul even without the body.22 
The other type of love, the passionate, is, as we have seen, the result of the 
union of body and soul. Although this kind of love is unavoidable insofar as we 
are incarnate, it is in fact nothing but a "confused thought."23 Here the com- 
plexities associated with Descartes's views on the nature of love between per- 
sons begin to manifest themselves. For the union of body and soul has resulted 
in the emergence of ideas which are by definition not clear and distinct and 
which may ipso facto involve us in "erroneous" relations with the external 
world. When speaking of love, Descartes does not explicitly warn against "er- 
ror," but he does caution us against any love which rests on a "bad foundation," 
which is "unjustified" and which "joins us to things which may be harmful or 
at least which deserve less consideration than we give them,"24 thus invoking at 
least the possibility of checking our moral judgments against the world. 
So moral error with respect to this passion involves us in actions which are 
less than ideally grounded in a knowledge of the true worth of the beloved 
object. Does Descartes then advise us to purge the body-soul union of its con- 
fused and irrational elements? If so, and given the ineluctable union of body 
and soul in this life, how is this to be accomplished? If not, then is Descartes 
committed to the view that confused love, even love which involves us in error, 
is morally permissible? It is in the context of these questions that I turn to 
Irving Singer's distinction between "appraisal" and "bestowal" and his critique 
of Descartes. 
II. If, as Cicero tells us, love is the attempt to form a friendship inspired by 
beauty, then what of that love which sees and creates value in the non-beautiful 
but nevertheless beloved other? This is the dilemma which Irving Singer has, 
throughout his career, tried to come to grips with. Singer sees two strands of 
thought coming out of the history of philosophical reflection on love. The first, 
what he identifies as "appraisal," describes the broadly Platonic-Augustinian 
approach to love. Here, the beloved is idealized as the bearer of a purposive, 
transpersonal value like the Beautiful or the Good (the Ciceronian conception 
just alluded to). What is important about appraisive valuing is that it is always 
an evaluating in accordance with a publicly recognized, hence "objective" stan- 
22 Letter to Chanut, 1.2.1647 (AT, IV, 600). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul article 142 (AT, XI, 435). 
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dard. The task of evaluating thus calls for the judgment of relatively impartial 
"experts" whose chief virtue is their knowledge of the moral facts. As the ap- 
praiser would have it, when it comes to love the question of the Euthyphro is 
easy to answer: we love solely because the object of our love is lovable. 
The other strand, emerging chiefly from the Lutheran-Kantian tradition of 
thinking (but also extending, though less conspicuously, back to Plato), Singer 
terms "bestowal." This refers to the spontaneous creation of value in the be- 
loved, the attempt to see the latter as inherently worthy even in spite of that 
person's possible failure to reflect a transpersonal ideal. This type of love, Singer 
writes, "supplements the search for human value with a capacity for bestowing 
it gratuitously. To one who has succeeded in cultivating this attitude, anything 
may be an object of love."25 Unlike appraisive valuing, therefore, which insists 
that the lover must strictly reflect an externally present and verifiable reality, 
bestowed value cannot be generated solely from outside. Singer therefore sees 
bestowal as the seminal value in love between persons as such. The chief prob- 
lem with the tradition of appraisal is that it cannot articulate this human, all too 
human type of love. So the bestower's answer to Plato's question is as unam- 
biguous as was the appraiser's: something is lovable because we love it. 
Descartes, according to Singer, sees love as strictly appraisive: 
In this world ... the soul is always joined to the body which generally 
makes it necessary for rational love to be accompanied by love as a 
passion. For Descartes this only means that the body is disposed to 
further those interests of the soul which constitute intellectual love. At 
no point does Descartes suggest that the impulses or instincts of the 
body contribute to such love.26 
Singer concludes from this that love for Descartes depends on knowledge of 
the truth,27 that the function of human beings as lovers is not conceptually 
distinct from their function as knowers. As I stated at the outset, the sides of 
this problem are too abstractly separated in the Singer-Plato formulation, and 
this is the source of Singer's occasional misrepresentations of various philoso- 
phers within the tradition. But the distinction itself is useful and can in fact be 
employed to enrich our understanding of Descartes's position. The immediate 
problem to be addressed, therefore, is the claim that Descartes falls squarely 
25 Irving Singer, The Nature of Love (Chicago, 1984), I, 14. We might well question 
Singer's extreme formulation of the theory of bestowal here. Judgments about moral objects 
are not made in a vacuum, and it is therefore unlikely that "anything" may be an object of love 
for the bestower or that the latter's bestowing activity is utterly "gratuitous." I owe this point 
to an anonymous reader at JHI. 
26 Ibid., II, 259. 
27 Ibid., 260. 
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within the camp of appraisal-philosophers; and this, I suggest, is misguided. 
From the fact that Descartes wants to subordinate bodily impulses to judgmen- 
tal control (which he does), it does not necessarily follow that he subordinates 
the passion of love utterly to the demands of epistemic or moral certainty. In 
fact, it is precisely this inference I want to challenge. The fulcrum of my argu- 
ment is a reading of Descartes on the freedom of the will. 
III. There is an indisputably strong current of appraisal as a generally posi- 
tive value in Descartes's thinking. To see this we need only look at his doctrine 
of the will. In the Fourth Meditation Descartes says that "(the will) consists 
simply in the fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirma- 
tion or denial ... our inclinations are such that we do not feel we are determined 
by any external force."28 However, Descartes goes on to say that, although not 
externally compelled, we are not merely indifferent to our possible alternative 
choices. Indeed, indifference is held to be the "lowest grade of freedom."29 
Instead, we are most free when we act according to knowledge of the true and 
the good. The intellect offers up the right choice after clear and distinct reflec- 
tion and the will is then freely compelled to act on this choice, although we are 
in this case unconscious of being moved by outside forces. This is undoubtedly 
the paradigm of right action for Descartes: where knowledge according to clear 
and distinct ideas justifies and counsels the final assent of the will. The will is 
of course involved in the initial act of election, since it is responsible for evalu- 
ating objects in the first place, but in the end it is bound to assent to the deter- 
minations of the appraising intellect. 
But should we think of the will as always and only guided by the light of 
clear and distinct ideas? There is another strain in Descartes's thinking on the 
will which emerges most conspicuously in a letter to Mesland of 1645 and 
which challenges to some extent the view expressed in Meditation Four. In 
clarifying to Mesland what he meant by "indifference" in the Meditations ac- 
count of freedom, Descartes now asserts that he cannot find fault with those 
who see indifference, when properly defined, as a"positive faculty." According 
to this understanding, not only is the will able to move in a direction contrary to 
that prescribed by evident reasons, but in doing so it may even be expressing 
itself in an ideally free manner: "For it is always open to us to hold back from 
admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good thing to 
demonstrate the freedom of our will by doing so."30 Descartes maintains fur- 
ther that freedom may consist precisely "in a greater use of the positive power 
which we have of following the worse although we see the better."3' 
28 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (AT, VII, 57). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Letter to Mesland, 2.9.1645 (AT, IV, 173). 
3' Ibid. 
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Descartes's purpose in this letter is in fact to defend his original conception 
of indifference as the lowest grade of freedom, that state in which we are sim- 
ply not moved by any of our possible courses of action. In contrast to this 
situation, being moved by objects which are contrary to reason is seen as a free 
use of a positive power. But by arguing that the will can be free both in refusing 
to assent to a clearly perceived truth or in pursuing a good which is clearly 
contrary to reason, Descartes seems to have compromised significantly the stark 
earlier view of the will as wholly subservient to reason. This single letter may 
not, of course, be sufficient to overturn the powerful metaphysic of the Medita- 
tions, but it does indicate quite clearly a new direction in Descartes's thinking 
on this question between 1641 and 1645. 
Anthony Kenny disagrees with this interpretation of the letter to Mesland, 
asserting that it is of a single piece with the doctrine of the Meditations. Kenny 
argues that when Descartes claims it is always open to us to hold back from 
pursuing a clearly known good he does not mean that we can do this while we 
are in fact in apprehension of the true and the good. At the moment of such 
apprehension our will is compelled to assent to the perception of truth or good- 
ness, an idea which is indeed in substantial accord with the earlier view.32 
Katherine Sherman notes that what Kenny overlooks is the reason this is so. If 
the will refused assent to a clear and distinct perception of the truth it would 
involve itself in a contradiction since Descartes defines a clear and distinct idea 
as one which appears only to the attentive mind and the ability to direct atten- 
tion is precisely an act of will. The will cannot simultaneously hold attention 
and withdraw it. Thus in saying that a person can refuse assent to a clearly 
perceived truth, Descartes is only saying that by doing so such a person would 
simply cease having a clear and distinct perception of that truth.33 The deeper 
problem for Descartes's account is how to explain the very possibility of the 
initial move from the apprehension of an evident truth to the subsequent with- 
drawal of attention from it without undermining the strong claim that we must 
assent to evident truths. 
Kenny, claiming to echo Descartes, considers such a withdrawal of atten- 
tion possible if we believe it to be a good thing to demonstrate our "perversity" 
in doing so. Kenny adds correctly that this notion was there in Descartes's 
thinking at least as early as the Meditations.34 What Sherman herself over- 
looks, despite her focus on the Passions, is the question as to what could pos- 
32 Anthony Kenny, "Descartes on the Will" Cartesian Studies, ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford, 
1972), 1-31. 
33 Katherine Sherman, "Descartes' Change of Mind," Philosophical Forum, 5 (1974), 
557-71. 
34 Kenny, "Descartes on the Will," 18. The relevant passage from the Meditations is (AT, 
VII, 57). It should also be noted that Kenny disputes the 1645 dating of the letter to Mesland. 
His case on this point is convincing, but so long as the letter falls between the Meditations and 
the Passions (which it certainly does) my point here carries. 
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sibly provide the will with a compelling motive for rejecting a clearly and 
distinctly perceived truth in favor of one more obscurely perceived (or of none 
at all). I will return to this point below. Although we might object to the moral- 
istic tone of Kenny's formulation, such an act of will would indeed appear 
strange if not perverse. 
Nevertheless, I think an answer to Kenny can be found in Descartes's last 
significant articulation of the problem of the will in The Passions of the Soul, 
written in the winter of 1645-46 and published in 1649, a year before Descartes's 
death. Kenny's claim that Descartes's thinking on the problem of human free- 
dom undergoes no real transformation in the later works is untenable in view of 
the fact that he, Kenny, ignores this text altogether.35 In the Passions Descartes 
makes no reference to the view of the will as the ineluctable executor of the 
understanding's clearly and distinctly perceived ideas but instead further devel- 
ops the position sketched in the letter to Mesland. So even though the latter 
position is present in the Meditations, it is significantly muted there; but this is 
not the case in the Passions, where it becomes the dominant position. It is 
therefore impossible to deny for Descartes a strong shift of emphasis on this 
point. 
IV. In the Passions the will is seen as that faculty which undertakes the acts 
of bestowing and of holding assent. Consider the following statement, which 
connects the problem of free will to that of the love passion: 
[I]n using the word "willingly" [de volonte] I am not speaking of de- 
sire which is a completely separate passion relating to the future. I 
mean rather the assent by which we consider ourselves henceforth as 
joined with what we love in such a manner that we imagine a whole of 
which we take ourselves to be only a part, and the thing loved to be the 
other.36 
Here Descartes wants us to think about that assent by which we consider our- 
selves as committed, into the future, to a given course of action or judgment. 
This describes the ability to "take a stand" on something, to establish a connec- 
tion with the object in question which is solidified and preserved by the act of 
assent itself and by the benevolent activity which follows from it. 
Now insofar as commitment entails sticking to a single judgment in the 
face of possible alternatives, this view of the will seems to conflict-at least 
35 In a paper devoted to showing that Spinoza's conception of Descartes's "absolutist" 
doctrine of freedom is misguided, John Cottingham is guilty of the same oversight (despite the 
promising title of his paper) ("The Intellect, the Will and the Passions: Spinoza's Critique of 
Descartes," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26 [1988], 239-57). 
36 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul article 80 (AT, XI, 387). 
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potentially-with the dominant one in the pre-1645 sources. That is, on this 
view it would be plausible to suppose that the will could establish and preserve 
its attachment o something even in the face of the intellect's opposing counsel. 
This may of course lead to "error" (nor is the reciprocity of the love-union 
which Descartes stresses in the previous citation by itself sufficient to elimi- 
nate the possibility of moral error: both parties may be deluded). Indeed, as 
Descartes makes clear in the Reply to the Fifth Objection, it is the most potent 
source of error. The will extends further than the intellect and so can attach 
itself to objects of which the intellect might not approve. 
But it might also be the case that the intellect may simply not be able fully 
to "grasp" the object in question, "since in the case of any given object there 
may be many things about it that we desire but very few things of which we 
have knowledge."37 The natural response to this sort of impasse, the one Descartes 
himself offers in the Meditations, is that we should simply suspend our judg- 
ment until such time as matters become clearer to us. But in many practical 
situations, this is neither possible nor desirable, as Descartes explains to Eliza- 
beth: 
[A]lthough we cannot have certain demonstrations of everything, we 
nevertheless ought to take a position and embrace the opinions that 
seem to us the most probable in regard to all the things in practice, so 
that whenever it is a question of acting we may never be irresolute- 
which is what causes regrets and repentances.38 
We have seen that in the Mesland letter Descartes goes further than this in 
allowing for adherence to the merely probable not only as a provisional neces- 
sity but even in the face of demonstrably certain contrary truth claims. In both 
letters we see that Descartes thinks it imperative to take a position on important 
matters, whether "good" reasons for doing so are evident or not and this em- 
phasizes clearly the role of the will as free causal agent. To this extent the will 
leads the intellect and its activity, driven by desire, is therefore requisite in 
order to pick out beloved objects in the first place. This ability freely to create 
an attachment to a beloved object and then to imaginatively fortify one's at- 
tachment to it is the sine qua non of bestowal as Singer understands it. 
My point is that the latter view of the will is especially pertinent to an 
understanding of what it is to love someone and that "error" in this case is not 
a compelling worry for Descartes. Indeed it seems to me that this picture of the 
will as both (potential) discoverer of the beloved object and as that faculty 
which allows for sustained commitment to it can be seen respectively as the 
37 Descartes, Objections and Replies (AT, VII, 377). 
38 Letter to Elizabeth, 9.15.1645 (AT, IV, 295). 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing the real value of the object. 
Much hangs, therefore, on which faculty-the will or the intellect-should 
properly qualify as the sufficient condition in the latter formulation, since the 
one we choose will be the ultimate arbiter in love judgments. 
Descartes's "theory of association" helps clarify and buttress my claim that 
the will as free bestower is supreme in this respect. This theory also goes a long 
way toward accounting for the "perversity" involved in diverting attention from 
clearly and distinctly perceived truths by way of offering compelling psycho- 
logical motivation for such an act. In a letter to Chanut, Descartes tells the story 
of a little girl whom he, Descartes, had loved when he was a child. This girl had 
a squint in her eyes which became for Descartes so attached to the love he felt 
for the girl that he could never thereafter see a person with a squint without 
feeling an upsurge of love.39 Descartes is trying to address Chanut's question as 
to how we can love someone before knowing his or her real worth. Descartes's 
answer is rooted in the speculative physiological account he gives of the phe- 
nomenon of love in the Passions. (There Descartes describes the movement of 
blood and spirits which gives rise to love. Briefly, the thought of an object of 
love forms an impression in the brain which directs the animal spirits to the 
muscles surrounding the intestines and stomach. This then forces the alimen- 
tary juices to the heart, causing a great swell of heat there. These spirits are so 
powerful that they cause the soul to dwell upon the object of love. Descartes 
goes on to say that the first and formative experience we all had of love was in 
the womb where we "fell in love" with the "fuel" which nourished us. The soul 
wanted to join itself to this fuel because of the heat which it maintained in the 
body.40) 
In the same letter to Chanut, Descartes maintains that notwithstanding the 
blind physiological compulsion to love as a matter of mere associative habit, 
we can control our love-judgments. He states flatly that a wise man will not 
merely submit to these physiological promptings but will reflect carefully on 
the real worth of the object in question. I do not want to gainsay the strongly 
appraisive tone of such claims, but I would suggest that Descartes is on the 
whole less worried about the sway of habitual associations than he is about a 
person being dominated by the barrage of conflicting bodily impulses. Through 
association, be it ever so imaginatively distorted, a person at least establishes 
authority over the body. In the case of love this authority is precisely what 
allows for the constancy of the will's attachment to a beloved object. 
In speaking about Descartes's principle of association, Anthony Levi makes 
the following claim: 
39 Letter to Chanut, 6.6.1647 (AT, V, 50). 
40 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul article 102 (AT, XI, 404). 
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The ethical importance of the principle of association lies in the fact 
that we can both destroy and create associations between the passions 
and the movements of the spiritspar habitude and therefore acquire an 
empire tres absolu over the passions.41 
Note that, according to Levi, the primary ethical import of our faculty of asso- 
ciation is not that it allows us to dispense with erroneous judgments, but that it 
gives us control over the passions. The ability to manipulate associations is 
here seen as an end in itself as long as it allows us to establish control of the 
body. With all this talk of dominating the body it might be objected that I am 
just agreeing with Singer; but this is not so, for Singer's essential claim is that 
passionate love must, for Descartes, be subordinated to rational love, which 
always involves washing our judgments clean of all error. 
The need to act determinately, however, is not synonymous with the need 
to act in truth, a point Descartes makes in addressing the problem of conflict 
among the passions: 
it is true that very few people are so weak and irresolute that they 
choose only what their passion dictates. Most have some determinate 
judgments which they follow in regulating some of their actions. Often 
these judgments are false and based on passions by which the will has 
previously allowed itself to be conquered or led astray; but because the 
will continues to follow them when the passion which caused them is 
absent they may be considered its proper weapons and we may judge 
souls to be stronger or weaker according to their ability to follow these 
judgments more or less closely and resist the present passions which 
are opposed to them.42 
Again, although Descartes goes on in this article to say that true judgments are 
in general to be preferred to false ones since they will give us less cause to 
repent, the focus is not on the need to supplant false judgments with true ones. 
Not at all: here what is crucial in the face of conflicting passions is to stick to 
one's chosen course, even if that course is "false." Precisely these judgments, 
qua actions of the soul, express the "natural" freedom of the will, "which can 
never be restrained" in making them.43 This radicalizes Descartes's comment 
to Elizabeth (quoted above) that in order to avoid regrets and repentances we 
need to act resolutely. Now the need for resolute or determinate action is seen 
41 Anthony Levi, French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions, 1585-1649 (Oxford, 1964), 
280. 
42 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul article 49 (AT, XI, 368), my emphasis. 
43 Ibid., article 41 (AT, XI, 359). 
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to extend even to those judgments and actions which are false. The search for 
truth here cedes pride of place to the imperative to oppose present passions on 
the strength of learned judgments, whether true or false. The latter task is only 
said to require "sufficient ingenuity in training and guiding" the passions.44 
Moreover, insofar as the holding of assent is based on past relations of will and 
bodily impulse, the body is never fully transcended in passionate love. 
So Descartes thinks that the will's "proper weapons" are the individual's 
"often false" determinate judgments. But if these are themselves by definition 
the product of the body-soul union, how can Singer legitimately maintain that 
for Descartes the body's only function in love is to contribute whatever it can to 
the interests of purely intellectual love, a kind of love which can presumably 
never be grounded in erroneous judgments?45 Determinate judgments do not 
move the cognitive process up to the rarefied heights of the disembodied un- 
derstanding. The love passion, even when successfully "controlled" through 
associative habit, remains a necessarily concrete phenomenon. It is not a case 
of the mind lording it over the body but of absent passions organizing and 
quelling present passions according to the demands of a relatively freely cho- 
sen value system. 
As Singer sees it, love as bestowal cannot be delusional or mistaken. It is 
not a way of knowing the world but rather "an imaginative means of bestowing 
value which would not exist otherwise."46 The beloved is valued within a con- 
text which affirms his or her importance in spite of the assessment of appraisal. 
This is not to say that love as bestowal exists solely and obstinately to spite and 
oppose the calculations of the appraising mind; appraisal might very well cor- 
roborate a set of values freely bestowed. But the intellect is not the final court 
of appeal. Remembering that the will attached itself spontaneously to the ob- 
ject in the first place, we can say that the economy of love as a passion-and 
not simply as intellectual appreciation-is fully a determination of the will in 
its dual role as discoverer/holder of assent. The assent itself issues from the 
needs of a unified psycho-physical system and this system is the expression of 
a created individual identity whose preservation and enhancement must be fur- 
thered even at the cost of overriding competing truth claims. In the language of 
active and passive powers from Part I of the Passions, the will here is viewed as 
an initiating agent whose activity in setting up movements in the pineal gland 
does not, at any point in the cognitive process, require directive input from the 
understanding qua "patient."47 
44 Ibid., article 50 (AT, XI, 369). 
45 Singer, The Nature of Love, II, 259. 
46 Ibid., I, 17. 
47 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, articles 1 and 2 (AT, XI, 328). 
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Even the feeling of benevolence for the beloved which love induces is 
largely a function of maintaining and enhancing the system. Once we have 
joined ourselves to the beloved-an act which involves a good deal of blind- 
ness to competing objects (including, possibly, "worthier" ones)-we will natu- 
rally be inclined to enrich imaginatively the value of the beloved: 
as soon as we have willingly joined ourselves to some object, whatever 
its nature may be, we feel benevolent towards it-that is we also join 
to it willingly the things we believe to be agreeable to it: this is one of 
the principal effects of love.48 
When we love something we want to join to it not those things which are good 
for it, but those things we believe to be good for it. How is it possible that this 
belief will not itself be coloured by the very love which provokes it, a love 
which, I have argued, has little regard for the demands of moral certainty? If it 
is so effected, the value of the beloved has been taken out of the community of 
objective value appraisers and placed in the grasp of the individual bestower. 
Still, I resist the temptation to see Descartes's philosophy of love as a jus- 
tification of narcissism and to paint Descartes himself as a kind ofproto-Proust. 
As we have seen in the conception of the will in the Fourth Meditation, the 
imperative to live in the light of clear and distinct ideas is never far from 
Descartes's thinking. Furthermore, he makes reference in the Passions to the 
fact that the love relationship is a whole which has a value above the selfish 
interests of its members,49 a point which should force on us the need to see the 
relationship, in part at least, from the outside. But the overwhelming focus of 
Descartes's philosophy of love is on the role of the free bestower of value, and 
this is why I argue that passionate love, this-worldly love, is something more 
than a mere confusion which as such must be clarified and disembodied. 
Descartes himself both invites this reduction and balks at it, a conflict which 
is encapsulated for example in the short passage he devotes to the passions in 
The Principles of Philosophy. There he asserts that in the case of joy for ex- 
ample "the act of imagination does not itself contain the feeling ofjoy" but that 
it does give rise to the movement of animal spirits which eventually results in 
the appropriate stimulation of the heart and the concomitant feeling ofjoy. He 
quickly adds that this whole process is preceded and determined by an act of 
judgment which affords us a purely "intellectual" experience of the passion. 
However, he almost immediately revokes the latter requirement when discuss- 
ing the passion of sadness as well as those of love, hate, fear, etc., asserting that 
48 Letter to Chanut, 1.2.1647 (AT, IV, 600). 
49 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, article 80 (AT, XI, 387). 
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"the mind itself may perhaps not know of any reason why it should be sad." 
This suggests that the process driving the animal spirits to the heart can be 
initiated in the absence of a command from the intellect or at least in the ab- 
sence of a clear and distinct command from it. Descartes goes on to say that 
purely imaginative love and purely intellectual love are "quite different in kind." 
Although they are often enough found together, he gives us no indication in 
this passage of which is worthier nor even if they admit of comparison.50 Al- 
though Descartes eventually abandoned any concupiscent/benevolent distinc- 
tion,5' this passage indicates that even when he held something like it, he was 
not unambiguously advocating the subordination of the passion to the apprais- 
ing intellect. 
It is clear therefore that in the case of love the call to rid ourselves of error 
is, if not silenced, at least suppressed for Descartes. I do not claim that this is so 
for all the passions (it is certainly not for hatred). There may be degrees of 
allowable error for the various passions depending on their functional roles, the 
way they preserve and/or perfect the person. That question is beyond the scope 
of this paper; but we can safely say that although it is not always clear how 
Descartes thinks the balance should be struck, he would evidently agree with 
Donne that love is a "medicine" which "sometimes would contemplate, some- 
times do." 
University of Toronto. 
50 Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy (AT, IXB, 317-18). 51 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, art. 81 (AT, XI, 388). 
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